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Sex, Lies, and Genetic Tests: Challenging the
Marital Presumption of Paternity Under the
Minnesota Parentage Act
Deborah A Ellingboe
[Miotherhood is a matter of fact and fatherhood a matter of opinion1
When Christopher Kelly and his married lover, Pamela Ca-
taldo, learned that she was pregnant with Kelly's child, they
planned to raise the child together.2 The couple even asked doc-
tors to perform in utero tests to confirm Kelly's paternity.3 After
1. Howard Richler, Move Over Bill, Matthew is the Big Name in Town,
THE GAzTTE (Montreal), Jan. 16, 1993, at J2.
A mother's identity is generally only an issue when babies are switched at
birth. Ronald J. Richards, Comment, DNA Fingerprinting and Paternity Test-
ing, 22 U.C. DAvis L. REv. 609, 610 n.5 (1989). Men, however, can seldom be
certain they are the father of their children. William F. Allman, The Mating
Game, U.S. NEws & WoRLD REP., July 19, 1993, at 56, 63. Medical sociologists
have attempted to document rates of "non-patemity," in which a father falsely
assumes a child to be his own. Sharon Kingman, One in Ten Tathers' May Not
Be a Parent, THE INDEPENDENT, Oct. 4, 1991, at 3. Some studies say that as
many as one in three fathers falsely believe their children to be their own. Id.
Other studies say that non-paternity rates are closer to one in ten. Id. Many of
these studies, however, are anecdotal and have no basis in fact. Id.
Non-paternity, of course, is not a modern concept. William Shakespeare,
for example, expressed his skepticism of the certainty of paternity:
We are all bastards,
And that most venerable man which I
Did call my father was I know not where
When I was stamped.
WILmm SHAKEsPEARE, CYMBELnE, act 2, sc. 5.
2. Kelly v. Cataldo, 488 N.W.2d 822,824 (Minn. Ct. App. 1992). Kelly and
Mrs. Cataldo allegedly were lovers between June 1987 and February 1988, and
again between spring 1989 and September 1990. Id. Mrs. Cataldo has been
married to Michael Cataldo since 1979. Id.
3. Id. Kelly and Mrs. Cataldo voluntarily completed genetic tests in De-
cember 1990. Id. In January 1991, they received an oral report from Mrs. Ca-
taldo's obstetrician, who told the couple that the tests conclusively established
Kelly as the child's father. Id. According to Kelly, Mrs. Cataldo also acknowl-
edged his paternity through letters and telephone calls. Id.
1013
1014 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 78:1013
the child's birth,4 Kelly sought to become part of his daughter's
life.5 Mrs. Cataldo, however, decided that she wanted to raise
the baby with her husband, Michael Cataldo. 6 She severed
Kelly's contacts with his daughter after only three visits. 7 Kelly
then filed a paternity suit in Minnesota court.s
Before 1989, Mr. and Mrs. Cataldo would have been secure
from Kelly's paternity claims, protected by a legal fiction called
the marital presumption of paternity.9 The marital presump-
tion presumes a man to be a child's father if he and the child's
mother are married when the child is born or were married at
the probable time of conception. 1° In 1989, however, Minnesota
amended its parentage act."1 The amended act still recognizes
4. Kelly and Mrs. Cataldo's daughter, M.C., was born May 13, 1991. Id.
5. Id. Kelly, a Massachusetts resident, visited his daughter three times in
Minnesota between May and July 1991. Id.
6. Id. at 824-25. Mrs. Cataldo and her husband have another daughter,
born in November 1988. Id. at 824. Mr. Cataldo said he considered both chil-
dren his family members. Id. at 825.
7. Id. at 824. Mrs. Cataldo discontinued his visits in July 1991. Id. Kelly
alleged that Mrs. Cataldo told him she wanted her daughter to have a normal
life. Id.
8. Id. at 825. Kelly filed suit in October 1991. Id. He asked the court to
establish his joint legal and physical custody of his daughter. Id.
9. The marital presumption evolved to protect illegitimate children, who
at one time could not inherit ori receive support from their fathers. Mary Kay
Kisthardt, Of Fatherhood, Families and Fantasy: The Legacy of Michael H. v.
Gerald D., 65 TuL. L. REv. 585, 588-89 (1991). At common law, however, a pre-
sumption in favor of the mother's husband only allayed the burden of illegiti-
macy for children whose mothers were married. Id. at 589. Still, for those
children, the presumption provided almost certain protection. When the pre-
sumption first arose in England, a party could only rebut it by showing that the
mother's husband was either out of the country or impotent at the time of the
child's conception. Id. Furthermore, under an evidentiary rule known as Lord
Mansfield's Rule, neither husband nor wife could testify to lack of access be-
tween them. See, e.g., C.C. v. AB., 550 N.E.2d 365, 371 (Mass. 1990).
When the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws
promulgated the Uniform Parentage Act (UPA) in 1973, its main goal was to
protect illegitimate children. UmIF. PARENTAGE AcT, 9B U.L.A. 287-88, (1987).
At the time the Commissioners drafted the UPA, a number of states treated
legitimate and illegitimate children differently. For example, illegitimate chil-
dren had no right of action for the wrongful death of their parents. Id. In addi-
tion, they often could not collect worker's compensation benefits for their
parents' death. Id. To better protect the rights of illegitimate children, the
UPA set up provisions by which to identify a child's legal father. Id. at 289.
These provisions collect "a network of presumptions" which, based on external
circumstances, declare a particular man to be the probable father. Id. One ex-
ample of such external circumstances is the marriage of the mother to a partic-
ular man. Id.
10. UIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 4, 9B U.L.A. at 298-99.
11. Minnesota Parentage Act, MnN. STAT. §§ 257.51-.74 (Supp. 1989) (cur-
rent version at MmNN. STAT. §§ 257.51-.75 (1992 & Supp. 1993)).
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the marital presumption of paternity, but it also includes a pre-
sumption of paternity based on blood or other genetic tests.12
Despite the 1989 amendment, however, it is unclear
whether biological fathers13 may sue for paternity when a mari-
tal presumption of paternity already exists. By adopting a pre-
sumption of paternity based on genetic testing, Minnesota
appeared to create new rights 14 in biological fathers by offering
12. Minnesota Parentage Act, MINN. STAT. § 257.55(1)(f) (1992). When the
marital presumption of paternity first arose, it arguably embodied the most
sensible approach to determining legal paternity. "The common-law rules
designed to deal with the issue of paternal identification, and particularly the
marital presumption, reflected the social attitudes and scientific knowledge of
their time." Kisthardt, supra note 9, at 593. With divorce becoming more com-
mon in the United States, however, non-traditional families carry less of a
stigma than they once did. Id. at 640-41. Neither children nor parents stand
out any longer in American society if the child has parents outside the "tradi-
tional" family. Id.
Furthermore, modern blood and genetic tests have revolutionized paternal
identification. When the courts first began to use blood tests to help establish a
child's parentage, the tests spoke exclusively to non-paternity. P.H. ANDRESEN,
THE HUMAN BLOOD GROUPS UTILIZED IN DISPUTED PATERNITY CASES AND CRIMI-
NAL PROCEEDINGS 33 (1952). In other words, the tests could say to a high degree
of probability whether a particular man was not a child's father. The early tests
were less accurate, however, in determining a child's father.
Some courts now use blood tests to establish paternity. Richards, supra
note 1, at 612. Although the blood tests cannot conclusively establish the pater-
nity of an alleged biological father, they can narrow a class of likely fathers
through probability formulae. Id. at 615 n.21. Thus, blood test experts can es-
tablish a particular probability that a given party is a child's father. Id. One
type of blood test, the human leukocyte antigen (HLA) tissue typing test, can
determine paternity with a 98% probability. Id. at 612 n.11.
A new type of testing, DNA fingerprinting, boasts even greater accuracy
than blood testing in establishing paternity. Id. at 613. DNA fingerprinting,
which creates "individual-specific representations of the DNA configurations of
the [alleged] father, the mother, and the child," positively identifies the child's
father, rather than determining a probable father by non-exclusion. Id.
With such changes in societal values and scientific knowledge, some states,
like Minnesota, have enacted presumptions of paternity based on genetic tests.
See infra note 25. Still, according to Texas District Court Judge John D. Mont-
gomery, the law has been slow in acknowledging these changes. "Because so
many people have lifestyles which antiquate a traditional notion of'family,' and
since science has so revolutionized human reproductive technology that con-
cepts of mother and father are ambiguous, it may well be past time to rethink
the law's definitions of 'mother,' 'father,' and even 'parents.'" John D. Mont-
gomery, Who's My Legal Daddy? A Bedtime Story for the '90s, Hous. LAw., May-
June 1992, at 20, 25.
13. This Note will use the phrase "biological father" as a shorthand for a
man alleging himself to be a child's biological father.
14. Some scholars disapprove of discussions of "rights" within family law.
See Kisthardt, supra note 9, at 585. They assert that such a focus favors the
individual and destroys the family. Id. They also assert that "rights" propo-
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them an opportunity to establish their paternity. 15 Yet in some
states with similar provisions for genetic testing, the courts re-
fuse to allow biological fathers standing to assert their paternity
when a marital presumption of paternity exists. 16 Minnesota
courts have yet to resolve this issue. 7
The purpose of this Note is to examine whether the 1989
amendment to the Minnesota Parentage Act (MPA)1s allows a
biological father standing to sue for paternity when a marital
presumption already exists. Part I surveys various states' pa-
ternity statutes, judicial interpretations of these statutes, and
the policies supporting these interpretations. Part II analyzes
the MPA and concludes that because the MPA creates rights in
biological fathers, biological fathers should have standing either
under the current amended MPA or as a constitutional right to
assert their paternity, even when a marital presumption of pa-
ternity already exists. This Note further concludes that once
such biological fathers assert their paternity, courts should use
the child's-best-interests test to determine which of two conflict-
ing presumptions should prevail.
I. A STATE-BY-STATE SURVEY OF PATERNITY
STATUTES AND THE RIGHTS OF BIOLOGICAL
FATHERS
A. STATE PARENTAGE ACTS AND THE UPA
Although state parentage statutes are not uniform, 19 many
share common characteristics. 20 In particular, several states
nents fail to engage in moral discourse. Id. Legitimate individual rights do
exist, however, that may conflict with family rights. Id. at 587.
15. Before genetic testing, a party could introduce only limited evidence
relating to paternity. See supra note 9 and accompanying text. To rebut the
marital presumption, a party had to prove either that the husband was impo-
tent or had no access to his wife at the time of conception. Id. Furthermore,
many states did not allow introduction of such evidence by anyone outside the
marriage. Kisthardt, supra note 9, at 594. "Such intrusions on the privacy of
the parties, particularly when there was an existing marriage, were considered
unwarranted." Id. By allowing biological fathers to present genetic tests to
show paternity, states create a new evidentiary resource for biological fathers
which, theoretically, carries the right to use the resource in a relevant action.
16. See infra note 34.
17. Kelly v. Cataldo, 488 N.W.2d 822, 823 n.1 (Minn. Ct. App. 1992).
18. MAIN. STAT. §§ 257.55(1)(f), 257.57 (Supp. 1989) (current version at
MwN. STATE. §§ 257.55(1)(f), 257.57 (1992 & Supp. 1993)).
19. See Traci Dallas, Note, Rebutting the Marital Presumption: A Devel-
oped Relationship Test, 88 COLuM. L. REv. 369, 373-74 (1988).
20. In the preface to the UPA, the Commissioners noted: "While perhaps
no one state now includes all these presumptions in its law, the presumptions
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have adopted provisions of the Uniform Parentage Act (UPA)21
that describe presumptions of paternity.22 The UPA presumes a
man to be a child's natural father if he and the child's natural
mother are married or were married at the probable time of con-
ception; if he receives the child into his home and holds the child
out as his own; or if he acknowledges his paternity of the child in
a writing filed with an appropriate state agency. 23 The UPA
does not include a presumption of paternity based on genetic
testing.24 Only four UPA states, including Minnesota, have
adopted an additional presumption of paternity based on such
tests. 25
are based on existing presumptions of 'legitimacy' in state laws and do not rep-
resent a serious departure." UNiF. PARENTAGE ACT, 9B U.L.A. at 289.
21. Eighteen states have adopted the Uniform Parentage Act: Alabama,
California, Colorado, Delaware, Hawaii, Illinois, Kansas, Minnesota, Missouri,
Montana, Nevada, New Jersey, New Mexico, North Dakota, Ohio, Rhode Is-
land, Washington, and Wyoming. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT, 9B U.L.A. 3 (Supp.
1993).
22. The UPA contains the following presumptions of paternity:
§ 4. [Presumption of Paternity]
(a) A man is presumed to be the natural father of a child if:
(1) he and the child's natural mother are or have been married to
each other and the child is born during the marriage, or within 300
days after the marriage [ends];
(2) before the child's birth, he and the child's natural mother have
attempted to marry each other .... although the attempted marriage
is or could be declared invalid, and [the child is born during the at-
tempted marriage or within 300 days after the marriage ends];
(3) after the child's birth, he and the child's natural mother have
married, or attempted to marry,... although the attempted marriage
is or could be declared invalid, and [he acknowledges his paternity, is
named on the birth certificate, or must support the child];
(4) while the child is [a minor], he receives the child into his home
and openly holds out the child as his natural child; or
(5) he acknowledges his paternity of the child in a writing ....
UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 4, 9B U.L.A. at 298-99.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Those states that have adopted a presumption of paternity based on
genetic testing include: Colorado, COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 19-4-105(1)(f) (West
Supp. 1993); Minnesota, MNN. STAT. § 257.55(1)(f) (1992); North Dakota, N.D.
CENT. CODE § 14-17-04(1)(f) (1991); and Ohio, Orno Ray. CODE ANN.
§ 3111.03(A)(6) (Anderson Supp. 1992).
Typically, these statutes follow the UPA._ See supra note 22 and accompa-
nying text (setting forth the UPA presumptions of paternity). The statutes also
contain a sixth presumption based on genetic testing. For example, the North
Dakota Century Code states that a man is presumed to be the natural father of
a child if he falls within one of the five provisions contained in the UPA, or "[f
genetic tests show that he is not excluded and the statistical probability of his
parentage is ninety-five percent or higher." N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-17-04(1)(f).
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The UPA's presumptions of paternity determine not only
whom the law will likely recognize as a child's father, but also
who has standing to bring an action to prove paternity or to es-
tablish the nonexistence of a father-child relationship. In gen-
eral, according to the UPA, only a child, the natural mother, or a
man presumed under the act to be the child's father may bring
an action to establish paternity.26 Furthermore, if the child's
natural mother and presumed father are married, only the child,
the child's natural mother, or the mother's husband may bring
an action to declare the nonexistence of the presumed father's
paternity.27 Under the UPA, therefore, a biological father may
26. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 6, 9B U.L.A. at 302. This section is as follows:
§ 6 [Determination of Father and Child Relationship; Who May Bring
Action; When Action May Be Brought]
(a) A child, his natural mother, or a man presumed to be his fa-
ther under Paragraph (1), (2), or (3) of Section 4(a), may bring an
action
(1) at any time for the purpose of declaring the existence of the
father and child relationship presumed under Paragraph (1), (2), or (3)
of Section 4(a); or
(2) for the purpose of declaring the non-existence of the father and
child relationship presumed under Paragraph (1), (2), or (3) of Section
4(a) only if the action is brought within a reasonable time after ob-
taining knowledge of relevant facts, but in no event later than [five]
years after the child's birth....
(b) Any interested party may bring an action at any time for the
purpose of determining the existence or non-existence of the father and
child relationship presumed under Paragraph (4) or (5) of Section 4(a).
Id. § 6, at 302-03.
27. Id. § 6(a)(2). A handful of UPA states, and some non-UPA states, also
limit those who may bring an action to declare the nonexistence of a husband's
paternity to the child, the child's mother, and the mother's husband. Those
UPA states whose parentage statutes limit those parties that may bring an ac-
tion to declare the non-existence of a husband's paternity include Alabama,
ALA. CODE § 26-17-6 (1992); California, CAL. FAm. CODE § 7630 (West 1993);
Colorado, COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 19-4-107 (West Supp. 1993); Illinois, ILL.
ANN. STAT. § 750 ILCS 45/7 (Smith-Hurd 1993); Missouri, Mo. ANN. STAT.
§ 210.826 (Vernon Supp. 1993); North Dakota, N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-17-05
(1991); and Wyoming, Wyo. STAT. § 14-2-104 (Supp. 1993).
Some non-UPA states have enacted stricter standards regarding which
parties may challenge the marital presumption of paternity. Oregon, for exam-
ple, has created a conclusive presumption of paternity in husbands who live
with their wives and were not impotent or sterile at the time their child was
conceived. OR. REv. STAT. § 109.070(1) (1990).
Other states' statutes allow any interested party, including presumed and
alleged fathers, to bring an action to determine the existence or nonexistence of
the parent-child relationship. UPA states whose statutes allow any interested
party standing to bring an action to declare the nonexistence of any presumed
father-child relationship include Delaware, DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 805(a)
(Supp. 1992); Hawaii, HAw. REv. STAT. § 584-6(a) (Supp. 1992); Montana,
MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-6-107(1) (1993); Nevada, NEv. REv. STAT. ANN.
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not bring an action either to establish his own paternity or to
declare the nonexistence of a husband's paternity.
28
§ 126.071(1) (Michie 1993); New Mexico, N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-11-7(A) (Michie
1989); and Washington, WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.26.060(1)(a) (West 1986).
The Washington Uniform Parentage Act, for example, provides:
A child, a child's natural mother, a man alleged or alleging himself to
be the father, a child's guardian, a child's personal representative, the
state of Washington, or any interested party may bring an action at
any time for the purpose of declaring the existence or nonexistence of
the father and child relationship.
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.26.060(1)(a).
The Kansas Parentage Act does not use the term "interested party" in
describing who may bring an action to establish paternity. Rather, Kansas al-
lows the child or any person on behalf of such a child to bring an action. KAN.
STAT. ANN. § 38-1115(a) (1986).
Some non-UPA states have adopted statutes that do not contain provisions
regarding actions to declare the nonexistence of a father-child relationship.
Rather, the statutes speak only to which parties may bring actions to determine
paternity. Georgia, for example, allows "one who is alleged to be the father" to
bring an action to determine paternity, without stating whether alleged fathers
may also bring actions to determine the nonexistence of another man's pater-
nity. GA. CODE ANN. § 19-7-43(a)(5) (Harrison 1991).
28. A biological father is not a man presumed to be the child's father under
the relevant paragraphs of the UPA. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 4, 9B U.L.A. at
298-99. A biological father, therefore, has no standing to bring an action to
declare the nonexistence of a father-child relationship established under the
marital presumption of paternity. Id. at 302-03.
The UPA does not clearly define what it means to either establish one's
paternity or declare the nonexistence of one's paternity. Id. Courts have devel-
oped conflicting interpretations of the provisions.
Some courts, for example, read the provisions separately. See, e.g., Kelly v.
Cataldo, 488 N.W.2d 822, 826 (Minn. Ct. App. 1992) ("Appellant's petition does
not expressly ask the court to adjudicate the nonexistence of Michael Cataldo's
father and child relationship with M.C., but it does ask that appellant be adju-
dicated as father."). Under this approach, an action to establish paternity can
create conflicting presumptions of paternity in two or more men, which the
court may then weigh in finally adjudicating paternity. Id. ("Once the conflict
is decided, ... the court's decree rebuts any contrary presumption."). By con-
trast, an action to determine the nonexistence of one's paternity can be brought,
for example, by a mother's husband who suspects he is not a child's father. See
UNIF. PARENTAGE AcT § 6(a)(2). A child's mother can also bring such an action
to declare the nonexistence of her husband's paternity and, simultaneously, de-
clare the existence of a biological father's paternity. See In re Marriage of Ross,
783 P.2d 331, 333 (Kan. 1989).
Other courts read the above provisions as interdependent, so that an action
to establish paternity carries with it a request that the court declare the nonex-
istence of any other existing presumptions of paternity. See Presse v.
Koenemann, 554 So.2d 406, 411 (Ala. 1989). The Alabama Supreme Court
stated that its parentage act does not allow a third party to assert paternity "to
the exclusion of a man who was married to the child's mother when the child
was conceived and born." Id. at 411; see infra note 32. Alabama courts, there-
fore, do not weigh conflicting presumptions of paternity. Instead, Alabama
courts treat actions to establish paternity as actions to disestablish (or to de-
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B. STATE COURT INTERPRETATIONS OF PARENTAGE ACTS
State statutory provisions fail to provide clear guidance for
determining whether a biological father has standing to assert
his paternity when a marital presumption of paternity already
exists. 29 In particular, it is unclear whether a biological father
must first have standing to declare the nonexistence of an ex-
isting presumption of paternity before he may seek to establish
his own paternity.30 To address the statutory silence or ambigu-
ity regarding this issue, courts have developed contrasting ap-
proaches to determine when a biological father may bring an
action to declare his paternity.31
1. Denial of Standing
Some courts mechanically deny biological fathers standing
to assert paternity whenever a marital presumption of paternity
already exists.32 Under this approach, even biological fathers
clare the nonexistence of) any other existing presumptions of paternity. Presse,
554 So.2d at 411.
29. The Supreme Court of Washington, for example, held that when an al-
leged biological father attempts to assert his paternity when the child's mother
is married to another man, the court must determine the child's best interests
before allowing the biological father to proceed with his action. McDaniels v.
Carlson, 738 P.2d 254, 262 (Wash. 1987) (en banc) ("Where someone outside the
family files a paternity action, the trial judge should consider the impact upon
the child in deciding whether the action may proceed."). The Washington Uni-
form Parentage Act, however, does not refer to the child's best interests in de-
fining who may bring an action to determine paternity. WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§ 26.26.060(1)(a). Instead, the act states that a man alleging himself to be the
child's father may bring an action at any time to declare the existence of the
father-child relationship. Id.
30. This uncertainty stems from the ambiguity of the phrase "declare the
nonexistence of a presumption of paternity." See supra note 28 for conflicting
judicial interpretations of the phrase.
31. Minnesota is a UPA state and, as such, Minnesota courts generally
turn first to other UPA states in interpreting the MPA. See Spaeth v. Warren,
478 N.W.2d 319, 323 (Minn. Ct. App. 1991). The approaches used by non-UPA
states to determine when a biological father may bring an action, however, are
generally consistent with the UPA provisions and often follow the approaches of
UPA states. See supra note 20 (stating that UPA presumptions are based on
common law).
32. See, e.g., Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110 (1989); Presse v.
Koenemann, 554 So.2d 406 (Ala. 1989); B.H. v. K.D., 506 N.W.2d 368 (N.D.
1993).
In Presse, for example, the Alabama Supreme Court held that a biological
father does not have standing under the state's parentage act to initiate an
action to establish paternity. 554 So.2d at 411. In Presse, Jean Ann (Presse)
Koenemann had an affair with Lynn Koenemann while married to Norman
Presse. Id. at 408. This affair produced a child, Shelly Rene Presse. Id. Three
years after Shelly's birth, Jean Ann and Norman Presse divorced, and Jean
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who have substantial contact with their children may not sue to
secure paternal rights.3 3 Courts that follow this approach also
deny biological fathers standing despite parentage act provi-
Ann married Koenemann. Id. The couple then sought to establish
Koenemann's paternity and to change Shelly Rene's surname. Id. The trial
court let the couple's suit proceed and, based upon the couple's testimony and
the results of blood tests, declared Koenemann her biological father. Id. The
Alabama Supreme Court reversed. Id. at 411.
The supreme court first found that res judicata barred Jean Ann's action to
disestablish Norman Presse's paternity. Id. The court found that Norman
Presse's paternity had been established during the couple's divorce. Id. The
court then found that the Alabama Uniform Parentage Act absolutely barred
Koenemann's action to establish paternity:
We cannot accept the proposition that our Legislature, in adopting
the UPA, intended for a third party to be able to assert his paternity, to
the exclusion of a man who was married to the child's mother when the
child was conceived and born, simply because the third party has since
married the man's divorced wife and, in so doing, allowed the child into
his home.
Id.
Thus, although Lynn Koenemann also fit the definition of a presumed fa-
ther, in that he took the child into his home and held her out as his own, the
court denied him standing to assert his paternity in the face of a marital pre-
sumption of paternity. Id. Under the Presse approach, a marital presumption
of paternity must already be in place in order for a court to deny a biological
father standing to assert paternity. If, however, a biological father files a pater-
nity action before a marital presumption of paternity arises, the biological fa-
ther typically may proceed with his action. See Fuss v. Superior Court, 279 Cal.
Rptr. 46, 50 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991).
33. In Michael H., Michael, the biological father, and Carole, the mother,
had an affair that resulted in a child, Victoria, in 1981. 491 U.S. at 113. The
birth certificate listed Carole's husband, Gerald, as Victoria's father, and he
claimed her as his own. Id. at 113-14. During Victoria's first three years, how-
ever, she and her mother lived occasionally with Michael, who also held Victo-
ria out as his child. Id. at 114. In 1982, Michael sought to establish his
paternity and right to visitation. Id. Victoria, through a guardian ad litem,
filed a cross-complaint and asserted the she should be allowed to maintain filial
relationships with both Michael and Gerald. Id. The California Superior Court
dismissed Michael's action to establish paternity, stating that California law
allows only a husband or wife to rebut the marital presumption of paternity.
Id. at 115. The court also denied Victoria and Michael's motions for visitation,
stating that California law does not allow visitation against the wishes of the
mother when the alleged father has been prevented from establishing his pater-
nity. Id. at 115-16. The court of appeal affirmed the trial court's judgment and
denied Michael's and Victoria's petitions for rehearing. Id. at 116.
The U.S. Supreme Court affirmed the California court, holding that the
California statutes that deny biological fathers standing to assert paternity
when a marital presumption of paternity exists do not violate the Constitution.
Id. at 121, 123-24. "Where [a] child is born into an extant marital family, the
natural father's unique opportunity [to develop a relationship with his off-
spring] conflicts with the similarly unique opportunity of the husband of the
marriage; and it is not unconstitutional for the State to give categorical prefer-
ence to the latter." Id. at 129.
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sions that allow for a presumption of paternity based on genetic
tests. 34 These courts assert, as a matter of policy and law, that
the sanctity of the family outweighs the interests of the biologi-
cal father in establishing paternity.3 5
The United States Supreme Court, in Michael H. v. Gerald
D.,3 6 upheld the constitutionality of denying biological fathers
standing to assert paternity when a marital presumption of pa-
ternity already exists.37 The Court, in examining a California
statute establishing a conclusive presumption of paternity in the
mother's husband,38 stated that the federal due process clause
does not provide biological fathers with a protected liberty inter-
est in asserting paternity.39
34. In B.H. v. KD., for example, the Supreme Court of North Dakota held
that a biological father lacks standing to assert paternity when a marital pre-
sumption of paternity already exists. 506 N.W.2d 368, 374 (N.D. 1993). The
court so held despite an amendment to the North Dakota Uniform Parentage
Act declaring a man to be a child's presumed father if genetic tests indicate his
probability of parentage to be at least ninety-five percent. Id. at 375. The court
stated that the biological father, who had requested the trial court to compel
blood testing of the parties, could not be found a presumed father absent the
results of such tests. Id. Consequently, the biological father lacked standing to
commence an action to request blood tests. Id. The court stated, "One cannot
commence an action without standing, based only on the hope that standing
may later materialize." Id.
35. See, e.g., Michael H., 491 U.S. at 129 n.7 (discussing the government's
interest in protecting the "unitary family.").
36. 491 U.S. 110.
37. Id. at 129-30.
38. The California statute at issue in Michael H. stated that "the issue of a
wife cohabiting with her husband, who is not impotent or sterile, is conclusively
presumed to be a child of the marriage." CAL. Evm. CODE § 621(a) (West Supp.
1989), quoted in Michael H., 491 U.S. at 115.
39. Michael H., 491 U.S. at 129-30 (noting that "[i]t is a question of legisla-
tive policy and not constitutional law whether California will allow the pre-
sumed parenthood of a couple desiring to retain a child conceived within and
born into their marriage to be rebutted").
The Court's decision in Michael H. met with waves of criticism. See, e.g.,
Kisthardt, supra note 9; Catherine A. Filhiol, Note, Michael H. v. Gerald D.:
Upholding the Marital Presumption Against a Dual Paternity Claim, 50 LA. L.
REv. 1015 (1990); Martin Guggenheim, Scalia Says Father Doesn't Know Best,
LEGAL TIMES, July 10, 1989, at 15; see also T. Carmen Loconto, Note, The Sub-
stantial Relationship Test: The Putative Father Gains Standing to Rebut the
Presumption of Legitimacy-C.C. v. A.B., 14 W. NEw ENG. L. REv. 79 (1992)
(comparing the Supreme Court decision to alternative state court approaches to
paternity adjudication); Pamela S. Nagy, Comment, Smith v. Cole: Triumph in
Family Court, 40 CASE W. REs. L. REV. 1157 (1989-90) (same). Nevertheless,
because the Supreme Court settled the issue in Michael H., this Note does not
focus on the constitutionality of denying biological fathers standing to assert
paternity.
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2. Child's-Best-Interests Test
Courts that follow the child's-best-interests test permit bio-
logical fathers standing to establish paternity, but only when a
trial court first determines it to be in the best interests of the
child.40 If a marital presumption of paternity already exists, a
biological father must convince a trial court that his interest in
establishing paternity outweighs the interest of the child's
mother and her husband in maintaining their family integrity.41
This approach forces the courts to consider the merits of a bio-
logical father's claim in order to resolve the procedural issue of
whether the biological father has standing.42 Unlike a mechani-
cal denial of standing, the child's-best-interests test accommo-
dates competing theories of child psychology. This test enables
courts to balance a child's need for stability within the parent-
40. In M.F. v. N.H., the New Jersey Superior Court stated that New Jersey
statutes specifically grant standing to "any man 'alleging himself to be the fa-
ther'" to bring an action to establish paternity. 599 A.2d 1297, 1299 (N.J.
Super. Ct. App. Div. 1991); see also Ban v. Quigley, 812 P.2d 1014, 1017-18
(Ariz. Ct. App. 1990) (stating that any alleged father has standing to assert
paternity, even if the mother is married to another man at the time the child is
born).
Before biological fathers may compel blood tests to prove their paternity,
however, they must show that such an action will be in the child's best inter-
ests. See M.F., 599 A.2d at 1300 ("We are... satisfied that mere standing does
not ensure that the action may proceed and that blood tests may be ordered.").
See infra part II.B. for an argument that courts should apply the child's-best-
interests test after a biological father has attained standing to assert paternity,
rather than to determine standing.
41. In Turner v. Whisted, the Maryland Court of Appeals instructed the
trial court:
[C]onsider the extent of [the alleged biological father's] commitment to
the responsibilities of parenthood, and balance his interest in estab-
lishing his status as [the child's] natural father against the [couple's]
interest in protecting the integrity of the familial relationships already
formed. This balance of interests should be considered in connection
with the courts paramount concern of protecting [the child's] best
interests.
607 A.2d 935, 940 (Md. 1992); see also Ban, 812 P.2d at 1017 (employing the
child's-best-interest test); M.F., 599 A-2d at 1300 (same); McDaniels v. Carlson,
738 P.2d 254, 261 (Wash. 1987) (en banc) (same).
42. Once a biological father has shown in a pre-trial hearing that his pater-
nity action is in the child's best interests, the trial court compels blood tests of
the parties. See M.F., 599 A.2d at 1300. "[B]efore blood tests may be ordered,
the trial court must make a finding... that establishment of plaintiffs pater-
nity and the rebuttal of the husband's paternity will serve the best interests of
the child." Id. Presumably, because the court has already weighed the child's
best interests in a pre-trial hearing, if the blood tests establish a presumption of
paternity in the biological father, that presumption will prevail over an existing
marital presumption.
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child relationship against a child's need to learn the truth about
his or her natural father.43
3. Substantial-Relationship Test
Under a third approach, courts consider whether a biologi-
cal father has developed a substantial relationship with the
child before allowing him standing to assert paternity.44 As
with the child's-best-interests test, the substantial-relationship
test forces biological fathers to prove the merits of their case
before they may gain standing to proceed with their action.45
The substantial-relationship test allows courts to determine
whether the traditional family unit is worth protecting against
attack by a biological father who can establish a substantial re-
lationship with the child.46 These courts analyze the relation-
ship between the biological father and the child to determine
"emotional bonds, economic support, custody of the child, the ex-
tent of personal association, the commitment of the putative fa-
ther to attending to the child's needs, the consistency of the
putative father's expressed interest, ... and any other factors
which bear on the nature of the alleged parent-child relation-
43. McDaniels, 738 P.2d at 261. In McDaniels, the Washington Supreme
Court stated:
A paternity suit, by its very nature, threatens the stability of the
child's world.... It may be true that a child's interests are generally
served by accurate, as opposed to inaccurate or stipulated, paternity
determinations.... However, it is possible that in some circumstances
a child's interests will be even better served by no paternity determina-
tion at all.
Id. (citation omitted); see also M.F., 599 A.2d at 1302 (concluding that the "de-
termination of the child's best interests must be based on all of the factors
which weigh upon the issue of the benefit or detriment of the child.").
44. See C.C. v. A.B., 550 N.E.2d 365, 372 (Mass. 1990) (reasoning that "the
existence of a substantial relationship between a putative father and the child
is an appropriate prerequisite for the commencement of an action [by the puta-
tive father to establish paternity]").
45. Presumably, as under the child's-best-interests test, biological fathers
who show a substantial relationship with their children at the pre-trial hearing
will prevail at trial if blood tests establish their paternity. See id. (stating that
the "existence or nonexistence of a substantial relationship between the puta-
tive father and child is relevant in evaluating both the rights of the parent and
the best interests of the child") (quoting R.R.I. v. S.G.P., 507 N.E.2d 736, 742
(Mass. 1987) (Liacos, J., concurring)).
46. See id. at 373. Some commentators also support the substantial-rela-
tionship approach. They suggest that the Constitution requires that a biologi-
cal father show a substantial relationship with his child before having allowed
standing to assert paternity in the face of a marital presumption. See Dallas,
supra note 19, at 369; Loconto, supra note 39 (praising the Massachusetts
Supreme Court's adoption of the substantial-relationship test).
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ship."4 7 Courts typically allow standing in cases in which "it will
certainly come as no surprise to the marital family that there is
a question as to paternity."48
4. Standing as a Constitutional Right
Finally, some courts allow biological fathers standing to as-
sert paternity as a matter of right under their state constitu-
tions.49 Following a due process analysis that is broader than
the United States Supreme Court's reasoning in Michael H.,50
these state courts reason that modern morals and values dilute
the policy rationale for denying biological fathers standing to as-
sert paternity.51 These courts also examine whether statutory
codes or common law establish rights in biological fathers in
general. 52 If state law grants biological fathers significant
rights, these courts tend to hold that states violate a biological
father's due process rights when they deny him standing to es-
tablish paternity.5 3
47. See C.C. v. A.B., 550 N.E.2d 365, 372 (Mass. 1990).
48. C.C., 550 N.E.2d at 373.
49. See, e.g., In re J.W.T., No. D-1742, 1993 WL 233448 (Tex. June 30,
1993); R. McG. and C.W. v. J.W. and W.W., 615 P.2d 666 (Colo. 1980) (en bane).
50. See supra notes 36-39 and accompanying text.
51. See In re J.W.T., No. D-1742, 1993 WL 233448, at *4-5 (Tex. June 30,
1993). In J.W.T., the Texas Supreme Court found that the concerns that moti-
vated the Texas legislature to establish the marital presumption of paternity
had largely receded. Id. at *5. The court found that the stigma of illegitimacy,
for example, had "diminished to the point that the Texas Family Code no longer
employs the term." Id. In addition, the court found that the marital presump-
tion is no longer necessary to establish paternity: "Current methods of scien-
tific testing provide more reliable and less intrusive means of determining
paternity." Id.
52. Id. at *6-7. In J.W.T., the Texas Supreme Court examined cases in
which the courts found due process rights in biological fathers of illegitimate
children. Id. The court then stated, "While these cases recognized only the im-
portance of providing due process to fathers of illegitimates, we conclude that
the right to be heard does not cease merely because the mother is married." Id.
at *7. For an examination of the development of Texas family law, see Mont-
gomery, supra note 12, at 20.
53. See, e.g., J.W.T., No. D-1742, 1993 WL 233448, at *9. The Texas
Supreme Court stated, "We do not say that our Constitution guarantees every
natural father ties with his illegitimate offspring. We do say that one who is
arbitrarily prevented from attempting to establish any relationship with his
natural child is denied due course of law under.., our Texas Bill of Rights."
Id.; see also R. McG. and C.W., 615 P.2d at 672 (holding unconstitutional the
Colorado UPA provision denying a biological father standing to bring an
action).
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C. THE MINNESOTA PARENTAGE ACT AND RIGHTS OF
BIOLOGIcAL FATHERS
1. The Parentage Act and Kelly v. Cataldo
The Minnesota Parentage Act (MPA), based on the Uniform
Parentage Act, took effect in 1980.54 At that time, the MPA con-
tained the same five presumptions of paternity set forth in the
UPA.55 The MPA also adopted the UPA's provisions concerning
standing.5 6 A biological father, therefore, could not be consid-
ered a presumed father based on genetic tests.5 7 Furthermore,
the MPA did not grant biological fathers standing to bring an
action to declare the nonexistence of a husband's paternity.58
When first enacted, therefore, the MPA did not allow biological
fathers standing either to assert their own paternity or to de-
clare the non-existence of another man's paternity.5 9 In addi-
tion, the MPA provision containing presumptions of paternity
also included a subdivision regarding conflicting presump-
tions. 60 The subdivision stated, "If two or more presumptions
arise which conflict with each other, the presumption which on
the facts is founded on the weightier considerations of policy and
logic controls." 61
In 1989, the Legislature amended the MPA to create a pre-
sumption of paternity based on genetic testing.62 To provide a
biological father access to create this presumption of paternity,
the Legislature also amended the MPA to allow him to bring an
54. MINN. STAT. §§ 257.51-.74 (1980) (current version at MINN. STAT.
§§ 257-.51-.75 (1992 & Supp. 1993)); MARGARET M. MAR~mAN & JODIE MET-
CALF, TECmCAL NoTEs: PARENTAGE 1 (1985).
55. MINN. STAT. § 257.55(a)-(e); see supra note 22 and accompanying text.
56. MINN. STAT. § 257.57.
57. Id. § 257.55.
58. Id. § 257.57.
59. Id. §§ 257.55, 257.57.
60. Id. § 257.55(2).
61. Id. The full text of § 257.55(2) is as follows:
Subd. 2. A presumption under this section may be rebutted in an
appropriate action only by clear and convincing evidence. If two or
more presumptions arise which conflict with each other, the presump-
tion which on the facts is founded on the weightier considerations of
policy and logic controls. The presumption is rebutted by a court de-
cree establishing paternity of the child by another man.
62. The amended MPA maintained the five UPA presumptions of pater-
nity, and included the following presumption of paternity based on genetic
tests: "Evidence of statistical probability of paternity based on blood testing
establishes that the likelihood that the man is the father of the child, calculated
with a prior probability of no more than 0.5 (50 percent), is 99 percent or
greater." MINN. STAT. § 257.55(1)(f) (1992 & Supp. 1993); see also supra note 22
(discussing the five UPA presumptions of paternity).
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action "at any time" to affirmatively establish his paternity
through genetic tests.63 The amended statute, however, re-
tained the provision that fails to expressly grant a biological fa-
ther standing to bring an action to declare the nonexistence of a
husband's paternity.64 In addition, the amendment did not
affect the provision regarding conflicting presumptions of
paternity. 65
Minnesota courts have yet to determine whether the
amended statute allows biological fathers standing to assert pa-
ternity when the child's mother is married to another man and,
thus, a marital presumption of paternity already exists. 66
Minnesota courts could focus on the MPA's failure to grant a bio-
logical father standing to bring an action to declare the nonexis-
tence of a husband's paternity and conclude that biological
fathers therefore lack standing to assert their own paternity in
the face of a marital presumption. 67 By contrast, the courts
could give effect to the language which states that a biological
father may bring an action "at any time" to establish his pater-
nity.68 If the courts adopt the latter interpretation, biological
fathers would be able to assert paternity even when a marital
presumption of paternity is already in place.69
A similar issue arose in Kelly v. Cataldo.70 The Minnesota
Court of Appeals, however, decided Kelly on other grounds and
did not address whether the MPA grants biological fathers
standing to assert paternity in the face of a marital presump-
63. MINN. STAT. § 257.57(2)(1).
64. According to the MPA, a child, the child's natural mother, or the
mother's husband (or former husband, if he and the child's mother were mar-
ried within 280 days of the child's birth) may bring an action to declare the
nonexistence of the marital presumption of paternity. Id. § 257.57(1)(b). A bio-
logical father seeking to establish paternity based on genetic testing has stand-
ing only to declare the nonexistence of a presumption of paternity established
by section 257.55(1)(d)-(f) (fathers who accept children into their home and hold
them out as their own, fathers who have filed an acknowledgment of paternity
with the state registrar of vital statistics, or fathers who establish paternity
through genetic tests). Id. § 257.57(2)(1)-(2).
65. Id. § 257.55(2); see supra note 61 and accompanying text.
66. Kelly v. Cataldo, 488 N.W.2d 822, 823 n.1 (Minn. Ct. App. 1992).
As mentioned above, statutory provisions do not provide a consistent guide
for determining whether courts will allow a biological father standing to assert
paternity when a marital presumption of paternity already exists. See supra
part I.B.
67. See supra part I.B.1.
68. MniN. STAT. § 257.57(2)(1).
69. See Kelly, 488 N.W.2d at 826.
70. 488 N.W.2d 822.
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tion.71 Nevertheless, Kelly illustrates how a case could arise in
which a court must consider whether a biological father has
stannding to assert his paternity. In Kelly, the plaintiff, Chris-
topher Kelly, brought suit to declare his paternity of a child born
to his married lover, Pamela Cataldo.7 2 Kelly relied on the re-
sults of genetic tests73 that conclusively established that he is
the child's biological father. 74 Mrs. Cataldo, however, denied
that Kelly fathered her child.7 5 The trial court dismissed Kelly's
suit, reasoning, in part, that even if the test results had created
a presumption of Kelly's paternity, he had no standing to bring
the action because a greater presumption of paternity existed in
Michael Cataldo, Pamela Cataldo's husband. 76
On appeal, Kelly argued that to deny him standing to assert
paternity violated his due process rights.77 He also reported
that he had obtained a written record of the genetic tests that
indicated he fathered Mrs. Cataldo's child.78 The appeals court
did not rule on the due process claim and remanded the case on
other grounds.79 In addition, the appeals court declined to ad-
dress whether the trial court's denial of standing was proper.80
71. See infra notes 77-79 and accompanying text.
72. 488 N.W.2d at 824; see also supra notes 2, 8 and accompanying text.
73. 488 N.W.2d at 824. Kelly, who had only received an oral report of the
test results, was unable to produce the tests themselves at the trial court level.
Id.
74. Id. at 825.
75. Id. She also refused to sign a waiver releasing the results of the genetic
tests. Id. Kelly had petitioned the trial court to compel Pamela Cataldo to sign
the releases necessary to obtain the test records. Id. at 824. The trial court
refused to order disclosure of the records. Id. Kelly also asked the trial court to
compel current tests to determine whether he is the biological father of Mrs.
Cataldo's child. Id. at 825. The trial court refused. Id.
76. Id. at 825. The court also stated that the genetic tests to which Kelly
referred were not before the court and, therefore, could not establish Kelly's
paternity. Id.
77. Id. at 828.
78. Id. at 825. The test results demonstrate a .994167 probability that
Kelly is the father of Mrs. Cataldo's child. Id.
79. Id. The court of appeals held that the trial court erroneously refused to
join the child as a party in proceedings. Id. The court also stated, however,
that it might consider Kelly's constitutional claim after a trial in which the
child appears:
Our review of [Kelly's constitutional] arguments is premature in light
of the scant record before us, the absence of an appearance for the
child, and the lack of a prior trial court decision shaping the applica-
tion of statutory law to the case and addressing the constitutional ar-
guments in the context of that application.
Id. at 828.
80. Id. at 825, 828. According to the appeals court, the issue before it in
Kelly was whether a court could determine an alleged biological father's stand-
1994] PATERNITY AND GENETIC TESTING 1029
Instead, the appeals court directed the trial court, on remand, to
consider the results of the genetic tests that Kelly produced, and
to weigh the conflicting marital and biological presumptions.81
The appeals court, therefore, avoided deciding whether Kelly
had standing to compel the trial court to order blood tests to es-
tablish his paternity, yet allowed Kelly standing to force the
trial court to weigh the conflicting presumptions of paternity.8 2
2. Statutory and Common Law Rights of Biological Fathers
in Minnesota
If Minnesota courts were to interpret the MPA as denying
biological fathers standing to assert paternity when a marital
presumption of paternity exists, the courts could still find that
the Minnesota Constitution guarantees biological fathers the
right to assert paternity.8 3 Indeed, biological fathers in Minne-
sota possess a number of statutory and common law rights in
this and other areas. For example, biological fathers of children
who have no other presumed father clearly are entitled to estab-
ing in Kelly's circumstances without joining the child as a party. Id. at 825.
The appeals court then refused to consider whether Kelly had standing to pro-
ceed with his action before the child was joined as a party. Id. at 828.
81. Id. at 828 ("[Appellant has gained access to the genetic testing results,
and this evidence will now come before the trial court on remand."). Although
the appeals court seemed to approve allowing Kelly standing to proceed with
his suit when it directed the trial court to consider the genetic test results, the
appeals court also implied that Kelly's standing to proceed with his action could
only be determined after the trial court balanced the competing presumptions
of paternity presented in the case. Id. at 826 ("It is evident that the child's role
in the case invites an ad hoc determination of the weight attributed to the two
competing parental presumptions existing here.") (emphasis added).
82. Because the trial court must consider the genetic test results, the ap-
peals court dismissed Kelly's claim that the trial court erred in refusing to com-
pel blood tests. Id. at 828. The appeals court thereby evaded "the difficult issue
which arises when a proceeding... is initiated by a man who shows reason to
believe testing will demonstrate his presumptive parenthood but who has no
present evidence of genetic testing." Id.
Furthermore, because the trial court must consider Kelly's genetic test re-
sults, it may no longer rely on its prior ruling dismissing Kelly's suit for lack of
such test results. Id. at 825. The trial court, therefore, must reevaluate the
case based on the competing statutory presumptions of paternity. Id. at 828.
83. See supra part I.B.4; see also infra notes 125, 128 (quoting the text of
the Minnesota Constitution's due process clause and describing the Minnesota
Supreme Court's approach to construing clauses in the state Constitution that
mimic clauses in the federal Constitution).
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lish their paternity, both at common law84 and under the
MPA.85
In addition, in most proceedings involving children, courts
must consider the child's best interests.8 6 This may be true even
if applicable statutory provisions fail to require such considera-
tion.8 7 For example, the Minnesota Supreme Court stated in the
context of adoption proceedings that Minnesota courts have
well-established independent authority to determine a child's
best interests.88 Barring biological fathers from asserting their
84. In re Zink, 119 N.W.2d 731 (Minn. 1963).
85. MniN. STAT. § 257.57(3). According to this subdivision, a biological fa-
ther may always bring an action to establish the paternity of a child whose
natural mother is unwed:
An action to determine the existence of the father and child rela-
tionship with respect to a child who has no presumed father under sec-
tion 257.55 may be brought by the child, the mother or personal
representative of the child, the public authority chargeable by law with
the support of the child, the personal representative or a parent of the
mother if the mother has died or is a minor, a man alleged or alleging
himself to be the father, or the personal representative or a parent of
the alleged father if the alleged father has died or is a minor.
Id.
86. See Kelly v. Cataldo, 488 N.W.2d 822, 826 n.5 (Minn. Ct. App. 1992).
In another Minnesota court of appeals case, Spaeth v. Warren, the court found
that it did not need to consider the child's best interests in adjudicating pater-
nity. 478 N.W.2d 319, 322 (Minn. Ct. App. 1991). The court stated that "Min-
nesota courts have not interpreted the parentage act to require a best interests
analysis." Id. The court in Kelly, however, significantly narrowed the Spaeth
ruling: "(Spaeth] does not purport to govern circumstances where the child is a
necessary party [to the proceeding]. In addition, Spaeth does not address the
conflicting presumptions arising where a man claims parenthood of a child born
to the marriage of others." Kelly, 488 N.W.2d at 826 n.5.
According to the MPA, a child is a necessary party in any action to declare
the nonexistence of the father-child relationship, or in any action to assert pa-
ternity in which the mother denies the existence of the father-child relation-
ship. MmN. STAT. § 257.60(3). According to Kelly, therefore, every case
involving conflicting presumptions of paternity requires analysis of the child's
best interests. 488 N.W.2d at 826.
87. The Minnesota Legislature, for example, specifically excised that por-
tion of the UPA that addresses a child's best interests. Spaeth, 478 N.W.2d at
323. Nevertheless, Minnesota courts have found that some UPA proceedings
require a child's-best-interests analysis. See supra note 86 and accompanying
text.
88. In re D.L., 486 N.W.2d 375, 379 (Minn.), cert denied, 113 S. Ct. 603
(1992). Although this case addresses Minnesota's adoption statutes, the court's
language may encompass any case in which a child's welfare is at stake. Id.; see
also State ex rel. Larson v. Halverson, 149 N.W. 664, 665 (Minn. 1914) ("It is
thoroughly settled law that the parent's right to the care, custody, and control
of his minor children is paramount to all other considerations, save the best
interests of the child .... ."). But see Spaeth, 478 N.W.2d at 323 ("A child's best
interests simply are irrelevant to the biological determination.").
1994] PATERNITY AND GENETIC TESTING
paternity, however, prevents the courts from fully exploring a
child's best interests.
The Minnesota Legislature also favors placing children with
blood relatives, and the courts have supported this decision.8 9
This policy, according to the Minnesota Supreme Court, "reflects
the common-sense notion that blood relatives are most likely to
look out for one another's interests, through good times and
bad."9 0
II. PROVIDING A BIOLOGICAL FATHER STANDING TO
ASSERT PATERNITY UNDER THE MINNESOTA
PARENTAGE ACT
Minnesota courts may interpret the MPA's provisions on
standing to assert paternity a number of ways.9 1 The MPA does
not expressly grant a biological father standing to bring an ac-
tion to declare the nonexistence of a husband's paternity.9 2
Thus, Minnesota courts could deny a biological father standing
to assert his own paternity when a marital presumption already
exists, rather than allow him standing to compel blood tests and
thereby create conflicting presumptions of paternity. 93 The
courts, however, should decline such an interpretation of the
89. In re D.L., 486 N.W.2d at 380. This preference appears not only at com-
mon law, but in various statutory provisions. Id.
90. Id.
91. See supra part I.B.1-4. Kelly v. Cataldo, which likely represents the
first opportunity Minnesota courts will have to examine this issue, does not
present the most compelling paternity case; the biological father has not devel-
oped such a substantial relationship with his child that a court's refusal to hear
his case would seem greatly unjust. 488 N.W.2d 822, 824, (Minn. Ct. App.
1992) (stating that the biological father had visited his child three times before
the child's natural mother cut off his contacts). The case, however, could still
support any of the four approaches to interpreting the MPA. See infra part
II.A-B.
Another approach to interpreting parentage acts not discussed in this Note
is to award dual paternity rights. See Smith v. Cole, 553 So.2d 847 (La. 1989).
Through dual paternity, a court may legally recognize both a child's biological
father and a presumed father. Id. at 851. Two states, Louisiana and Nebraska,
currently employ this approach. Id.; State v. Mendoza, 481 N.W.2d 165 (Neb.
1992). Certainly, the approach has some advantages that the other approaches
this Note considers cannot offer. See Smith, 553 So.2d at 851 (discussing how
dual paternity allows a child to establish true parentage, allows the state to sue
biological fathers for child support, and allows biological fathers the chance to
develop relationships with their children, all without upsetting the marital pre-
sumption of paternity). The Minnesota Parentage Act, however, bars Minne-
sota courts from adopting dual paternity. Kelly, 488 N.W.2d at 826. Therefore,
this Note will not consider that approach.
92. See supra notes 58, 64 and accompanying text.
93. See supra note 34.
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MPA in favor of an interpretation that allows a biological father
standing to assert paternity in the face of a marital presump-
tion. Indeed, the MPA does not explicitly require a biological
father to establish the nonexistence of a husband's paternity
before he may assert his own paternity.94 Furthermore, Minne-
sota's statutory scheme and common law, as well as policy con-
siderations, support an interpretation of the MPA that would
allow a biological father standing to assert paternity.
A. FINDING STANDING UNDER THE MINNESOTA PARENTAGE ACT
1. Interpreting the Act
The 1989 amendment to the MPA created a presumption of
paternity based on genetic testing.95 The amendment also
granted a biological father standing to assert paternity.96 Ac-
cording to the MPA, a biological father may bring an action "at
any time [to declare] the existence of the father and child rela-
tionship."97 A biological father may not, however, bring an ac-
tion to declare the nonexistence of any father-child relationship
based on the marital presumption.98 Only the child, the child's
natural mother, or the natural mother's husband may bring
such an action. 99
Some state courts interpreting similar statutes hold that bi-
ological fathers who may not bring an action to declare the non-
existence of a husband's paternity are also foreclosed from es-
tablishing their own paternity.'0 0 North Dakota, for example,
adopted a parentage act nearly identical to Minnesota's parent-
age act.' 0 ' The Supreme Court of North Dakota, in interpreting
the statute, concluded that because a biological father may not
declare the nonexistence of a husband's paternity, 0 2 a biological
father also lacks standing to compel blood tests, even though
such tests may establish his paternity. 0 3 According to the
94. See supra note 63 and accompanying text.
95. See supra note 62 and accompanying text.
96. MmN. STAT. § 257.57(2)(1).
97. Id. § 257.57(2)(1) (emphasis added).
98. Id. § 257.57(1)(b).
99. Id.
100. See supra notes 32, 34 and accompanying text.
101. In particular, both acts contain a presumption of paternity based on
genetic tests. Mm-N. STAT. § 257.55(1)(f); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-17-04(1)(f). In
addition, both vest standing to declare the existence or nonexistence of pater-
nity in the same people. MmN. STAT. § 257.57; N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-09-03.
102. B.H. v. K.D., 506 N.W.2d 368, 373 (N.D. 1993).
103. Id. at 375. The court stated, "[The biological father] argues that the
blood tests, if positive to his cause, would allow him standing to rebut the [mar-
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North Dakota court, therefore, the biological father would have
needed standing to declare the nonexistence of the husband's pa-
ternity before he could obtain standing to compel blood tests to
establish his paternity.10 4 The North Dakota statute, however,
like its Minnesota counterpart, 10 5 does not grant the biological
father standing to declare the nonexistence of a marital pre-
sumption.' 0 6 Thus, the court barred the biological father from
asserting his own paternity and precluded the weighing of con-
flicting presumptions that would ultimately determine legal
paternity.107
Because the MPA does not expressly condition a biological
father's right to bring an action to establish his paternity, how-
ever, Minnesota courts should not follow the Supreme Court of
North Dakota when interpreting the MPA. Instead, Minnesota
courts should find that the MPA does not require a biological
ital presumption of paternity].... [Wie believe [this argument] is fundamen-
tally flawed.... One cannot commence an action without standing, based only
on the hope that standing may later materialize." Id. This argument, however,
ignores that language in the North Dakota Century Code that allows the courts
to weigh conflicting presumptions of paternity. N.D. CNrT. CODE § 14-17-04(2).
The court seemed most disturbed, however, with the potential for abuse
that could result if it granted a biological father standing to assert paternity.
Id. The court stated:
Without the requisite test results, an individual like [the alleged bio-
logical father] cannot bring such an intrusive action, disrupting an es-
tablished family, hoping that tests ordered by the court will
subsequently vest him with standing to proceed. Too much irreparable
damage will have occurred to the family in the meantime; the potential
for abuse is too great.
Id.
Furthermore, in B.H., the natural mother admitted that she had inter-
course with the biological father around the time of her child's conception, but
stated that the act was not consensual. Id. at 370. Therefore, the court likely
was not sympathetic to the alleged biological father's arguments.
The court did state that if the genetic tests existed before the biological
father brought suit, he may have had standing to assert paternity. Id. at 375.
Thus, it does not necessarily follow from the reasoning of this case that a biolog-
ical father never has standing to assert paternity when a marital presumption
of paternity exists in another man. In Kelly v. Cataldo, for example, Kelly and
Pamela Cataldo submitted to blood testing before Kelly brought suit. 488
N.W.2d 822, 824 (Minn. Ct. App. 1992). In Kelly, however, Pamela Cataldo re-
fused to authorize a release so that Kelly could submit the tests into evidence.
Id. at 825.
104. B.H., 506 N.W.2d at 375.
105. See supra note 101 and accompanying text.
106. B.H., 506 N.W.2d at 374.
107. Id. at 378. North Dakota's parentage act contains a provision on con-
flicting presumptions of paternity that is identical to the provision contained in
the MPA. N.D. CE sr. CODE § 14-17-04(2); see supra note 61 and accompanying
text.
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father to declare the nonexistence of another man's paternity
before establishing his own. The MPA states that an alleged
father may bring an action "at any time" to establish his pater-
nity through genetic tests.'08 The MPA does not state that an
alleged father must first establish the nonexistence of another
man's paternity. 0 9 Thus, rather than read such a requirement
into the MPA, Minnesota courts should follow the plain lan-
guage of the statute and allow alleged biological fathers stand-
ing to bring suit at any time to establish paternity.
Furthermore, the MPA provides for cases in which courts
may face conflicting presumptions of paternity."i 0 The MPA
states, "If two or more presumptions arise which conflict with
each other, the presumption which on the facts is founded on the
weightier considerations of policy and logic controls.""' i This
provision, then, strongly implies that an alleged father need not
declare the nonexistence of another man's paternity before at-
taining standing to assert his own. If two or more presumptions
of paternity arise, the men involved obviously did not declare
the nonexistence of each other's paternity before gaining stand-
ing to assert their own paternity. Thus, courts should read the
MPA to allow any man to establish his own presumption of pa-
ternity without first seeking to declare the nonexistence of other
existing presumptions of paternity."12
Besides being consistent with statutory language, an inter-
pretation of the MPA that allows a biological father standing to
assert paternity in the face of a marital presumption also better
serves various policy considerations. Originally, the marital
presumption arose to protect the family and to minimize the
stigma attached to illegitimate children."i 3 The stigma sur-
rounding illegitimate children, however, has virtually van-
108. MINN. STAT. § 257.57(2)(1).
109. Id. §§ 257.51-.75.
110. Id. § 257.55(2).
111. Id.
112. Parentage act provisions on declaring the nonexistence of a presump-
tion of paternity have purposes other than displacing one presumption of pater-
nity in favor of another. See supra note 28 and accompanying text. This
supports a conclusion that parentage act drafters did not intend for provisions
on declaring the nonexistence of a presumption of paternity to control who has
standing to assert paternity.
113. Nagy, supra note 39, at 1165.
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ished.114 The remaining policy rationale behind the inviolability
of the marital presumption, then, is protection of the family.
Although states may elect a statutory scheme that attempts
to protect the marital family by denying a biological father
standing to assert paternity,115 in some cases such a statute
would not meet this objective. Indeed, a statute that denies a
biological father standing to assert paternity when the mother of
his child is married to another man often applies after the mari-
tal family is already damaged. 116 In Kelly v. Cataldo, for exam-
ple, Christopher Kelly and Pamela Cataldo had biological tests
performed that established Kelly's paternity. 117 Furthermore,
according to Kelly, Mrs. Cataldo told him that her husband
knew of their affair.118 No party involved in that case should
have been surprised to discover that Mr. Cataldo did not father
his wife's child. A denial of standing for biological fathers,
therefore, may not protect the inviolability of the marital family
to the extent its supporters suggest.
Furthermore, Kelly began to establish a relationship with
his alleged child before Pamela Cataldo discontinued his vis-
its.119 In cases in which biological fathers establish a substan-
tial relationship with their children, an outright denial of
standing to assert paternity fails to protect the "family" bonds
that the biological father has created with his child.120 Admit-
114. Id.; see supra note 12. In fact, the UPA does not use the term "illegiti-
mate" when referring to children born out of wedlock. UNiF. PARENTAGE AcT
§§ 1-30, 9B U.L.A. at 296-344.
115. Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 129 (1989).
116. See, e.g., Michael H., 491 U.S. at 113-15. In Michael H., the mother,
Carole D., had an adulterous affair with the plaintiff, Michael H. Id. at 113.
After Carole D. gave birth to her daughter, Victoria, she lived at times with
Michael H. and at times with another man before returning to her husband,
Gerald D. Id. at 114-15. Furthermore, Carole D. maintained her affair with
Michael H. after he filed suit to assert his paternity of Victoria. Id. at 114.
Carole's continuing affairs, therefore, and not the paternity suit were what
damaged her relationship with her husband.
117. Kelly v. Cataldo, 488 N.W.2d 822, 824 (Minn. Ct. App. 1992).
118. Id. at 825.
119. Id.
120. In Michael H., the United States Supreme Court upheld the constitu-
tionality of a California statute that establishes a conclusive presumption of
paternity in a mother's husband, stating that the state is free to favor the rights
of the marital family over those of the biological father. 491 U.S. at 129; see
supra note 33. The Court could also have recognized, however, that a biological
father and his child are as much a "family" as are a mother, husband, and child.
Professor Martin Guggenheim, in criticizing the Supreme Court's decision
in Michael H., stated, "Once fathers are meaningfully involved in their chil-
dren's lives and not merely biologically connected, it is unconstitutional to treat
them differently from mothers." Guggenheim, supra note 39, at 15.
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tedly, Kelly's three visits 121 are not compelling. Nevertheless,
cases arise in which this argument has merit.12 2 In such cases,
to deny the biological father standing to assert paternity contra-
venes the policy underlying the rule. Indeed, courts often sever
rather than strengthen family ties when they deny a biological
father access to his child.123
Minnesota courts, then, should not interpret the MPA to
deny biological fathers standing to assert paternity when a mar-
ital presumption of paternity already exists. The statute does
not compel such an interpretation. Furthermore, this interpre-
tation does not always serve the policies underlying the marital
presumption of paternity and often runs against changing social
norms. Many families do not need the marital presumption to
protect them from disruption. In addition, in some cases the
marital presumption itself, not actions brought by biological fa-
thers, interferes with established family bonds.
2. Standing as a Constitutional Right
Even if Minnesota courts were to find that the amended
MPA denies biological fathers standing to assert paternity when
a marital presumption of paternity exists, the courts should find
that the Minnesota Constitution protects an alleged biological
father's right to assert paternity. 124 Admittedly, a constitu-
tional challenge to a statute that denies a biological father
standing to assert paternity faces an uncertain fate.125 The
121. Kelly, 488 N.W.2d at 824.
122. In Michael H., for example, both the biological father and the guardian
ad litem for the child requested that the court allow the father and child to
maintain contact. 491 U.S. at 115. A psychologist who examined the child
found that she had developed a significant attachment to her biological father
and thought of him as her dad. Id.
123. "Absent some compelling reason, the law should not act to disrupt a
relationship that the child has formed." Kisthardt, supra note 9, at 630. Fur-
thermore, forcing a child to sever ties with a parent does not necessarily
strengthen the remaining family unit. "Children will often fantasize about the
missing adult and become resentful toward those who are responsible for the
termination of the relationship." Id. at 631.
124. A Minnesota appeals court faced a constitutional challenge to the MPA
in Kelly v. Cataldo, 488 N.W.2d 822 (Minn. Ct. App. 1992). The court, however,
remanded the case on other grounds without reaching the constitutional claim.
See supra part I.C.1.
125. It is unclear whether the Minnesota Supreme Court construes the Min-
nesota Constitution's due process clause more liberally than the United States
Supreme Court construes the federal due process clause. The Minnesota
Supreme Court has stated that "It]he due process protection provided under the
Minnesota Constitution is identical to the due process guaranteed under the
Constitution of the United States." Sartori v. Harnischfeger Corp., 432 N.W.2d
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United States Supreme Court rejected a constitutional challenge
to such a statute in Michael H. v. Gerald D. 12 6 Minnesota
courts, therefore, could follow the Supreme Court's decision in
Michael H. and uphold the MPA's constitutionality if the courts
interpret the MPA to deny biological fathers standing to assert
paternity when a marital presumption of paternity already ex-
ists.127 Minnesota courts should find, however, that the Minne-
sota Constitution compels a different result than that reached in
Michael H..128
The Supreme Court of Texas recently took this approach
when it upheld a constitutional challenge to a Texas statute that
denied biological fathers standing to assert paternity. 129 The
448, 453 (Minn. 1988). The Minnesota Supreme Court has also indicated, how-
ever, that it is willing to construe provisions of the Minnesota Constitution dif-
ferently than the United States Supreme Court construes similar provisions of
the federal Constitution. See State v. Davidson, 481 N.W.2d 51, 56 (Minn.
1992) ("We have stated that in appropriate cases we will construe liberties more
broadly under the state constitution than under the federal . . . ."); State v.
Russell, 477 N.W.2d 886, 902 (Minn. 1991) (Coyne, J., dissenting) ("[T]his court
may, and when the scope of a provision in the Minnesota Constitution differs
from that of its federal counterpart frequently does, construe the Minnesota
Constitution to afford greater individual rights than are afforded by the United
States Constitution.").
126. 491 U.S. 110 (1989); see supra part I.B.1. Some state courts follow this
decision. See, e.g., Presse v. Koenemann, 554 So.2d 406,418 (Ala. 1989); B.H. v.
K.D., 506 N.W.2d 368, 373-75 (N.D. 1993).
127. A petitioner in Minnesota would find it difficult to convince the courts
his case is any more compelling than the case the Supreme Court rejected in
Michael H. See supra note 33.
Christopher Kelly, the petitioner in Kelly who challenged the MPA's consti-
tutionality, had even less contact with his child than Michael H. had with his
daughter. Kelly visited his daughter three times before bringing suit to deter-
mine paternity. Kelly, 488 N.W.2d at 824. Michael H., by contrast, lived with
his daughter off and on for three years before seeking to adjudicate paternity.
Michael H., 491 U.S. at 114.
Furthermore, California and Minnesota are both UPA states. See supra
note 21 and accompanying text. Because Minnesota courts favor turning to
UPA states in interpreting the MPA, see supra note 31 and accompanying text,
a Minnesota court may follow California's approach and decide that the state
may deny biological fathers standing to assert paternity without violating the
constitution. But see supra note 38 and accompanying text (offering the text of
the California parentage act, which contains a conclusive presumption of pater-
nity in favor of the mother's husband). The MPA's marital presumption of pa-
ternity, by contrast, is rebuttable rather than conclusive. MI-N. STAT.
§§ 257.55(2), 257.57(1).
128. The Minnesota Constitution's due process clause states: "No person
shall ... be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law."
MINN. CONsT. art. I, § 7.
129. In re J.W.T., No. D-1742, 1993 WL 233448, at *1 (Tex. June 30, 1993).
The Texas Constitution's due course of law provision states: "No citizen of this
State shall be deprived of life, liberty, property, privileges or immunities ...
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court stated that "[slignificant twentieth century changes in the
resolution of issues affecting the family[, as] reflected in stat-
utes, demographics, alteration of social attitudes toward illegiti-
mates, and decisions of the Texas courts," compelled its
holding.130 For example, the Texas common law accords "great
respect for the biological bond between parent and child."131 In
addition, the Texas Family Code allows alleged fathers of chil-
dren of unwed mothers to establish their paternity.132 Thus, the
court found that Texas may not deny biological fathers standing
to assert paternity without violating the Texas Constitution's
due process clause. 133
Similarly, Minnesota courts should sustain a constitutional
challenge to the MPA-34 if the courts find that the MPA denies a
biological father standing to assert paternity.135 Minnesota
courts may justify such a holding with the same support that the
Supreme Court of Texas offered for its holding.' 3 6 For example,
while Texas law recognizes the bond between a child and a bio-
logical parent, Minnesota common law recognizes the desirabil-
ity of placing children with blood relatives.137 In addition, both
common law and the MPA allow biological fathers of children
who have no presumed father to establish their paternity.138
Furthermore, the MPA now allows biological fathers to establish
paternity through genetic tests.'3 9 Because the MPA offers bio-
logical fathers an avenue to establish paternity through genetic
tests, and because Minnesota law freely allows biological fathers
of children born to unwed mothers to declare paternity, Minne-
sota courts should find, as the Supreme Court of Texas did, that
"'the right to be heard does not cease merely because the mother
except by the due course of the law of the land." Id. at *2 (quoting TEX. CONST.
art. I, § 19).
130. Id. at *4.
131. Id. at *6. The court further stated, "[W]e recognized that '[tihe natural
right which exists between parents and their children is one of constitutional
dimensions.'" Id. (quoting Wiley v. Spratlan, 543 S.W.2d 349, 352 (Tex. 1976)).
132. Id.
133. Id. at *9.
134. See supra note 124 and accompanying text.
135. Minnesota courts need not rely on the Supreme Court's interpretation
of the U.S. Constitution in Michael H. v. Gerald D. See supra part I.B.1.
Rather, the Minnesota courts may declare the MPA to be in violation of the
Minnesota Constitution. See supra notes 125, 128 and accompanying text.
136. See supra notes 129-133 and accompanying text.
137. See supra note 89 and accompanying text.
138. See supra notes 84-85 and accompanying text.
139. See supra note 62 and accompanying text.
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is married."140 Changes in societal attitudes and family law,
then, compel a holding that denying a biological father's stand-
ing to assert paternity violates his constitutional rights.'41
B. BEYOND STANDING: A PROPOSED APPROACH FOR CASES
INVOLVING CONFLICTING PRESUMPTIONS OF PATERNITY
Once a biological father attains standing to bring an action
to assert his paternity, a court must either make the biological
mother and any presumed father a party to the action, or give
them notice and a chance to be heard.' 42 The biological mother
and her husband typically oppose suits brought by the biological
father because they intend to show that the husband is the
child's father.' 43 Consequently, a court must weigh the compet-
ing presumptions of paternity to adjudicate paternity. 44
Thus, a finding either that the MPA grants biological fa-
thers standing to assert paternity, or that biological fathers
have a state constitutional right to such standing, leaves open
the question of which of two conflicting presumptions of pater-
nity should control once a biological father establishes his pater-
nity. According to the MPA, courts that face conflicting
presumptions of paternity must favor "the presumption which
on the facts is founded on the weightier considerations of policy
140. In re J.W.T., No. D-1742, 1993 WL 233448, at *7 (Tex. June 30, 1993).
141. With changes in societal attitudes and family law, a better approach to
cases in which a biological father and a presumed father both seek paternal
rights would be to award dual paternity. See supra note 91. Dual paternity
allows the law to recognize a child's biological father without unduly disrupting
a marital family. See supra note 91. In this way, if both fathers are interested
in raising and supporting the child, the courts may consider whether such an
arrangement would be in a child's best interests, rather than arbitrarily select
one man to be the child's legally recognized father. See supra note 91. The
MPA, however, precludes courts from awarding dual paternity rights. See
supra note 91. Unfortunately, then, such an approach is beyond the scope of
this Note.
142. MIN. STAT. § 257.60. This section states in relevant part:
The biological mother, each man presumed to be the father under sec-
tion 257.55, and each man alleged to be the biological father, shall be
made parties or, if not subject to the jurisdiction of the court, shall be
given notice of the action in a manner prescribed by the court and shall
be given an opportunity to be heard.
143. See, e.g., supra notes 75-76 and accompanying text.
144. Mnqi. STAT. § 257.55(2).
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and logic."14 5 The MPA does not state, however, what policy or
logic considerations the court must weigh.146
In weighing conflicting presumptions of paternity, Minne-
sota courts should use the child's-best-interests test. Rather
than use this test as some courts do to determine when a biologi-
cal father may gain standing to assert paternity, 147 however,
Minnesota courts should apply the test after a biological father
has already gained standing to assert paternity. This approach
would allow Minnesota courts to consider the same factors that
other state courts consider when employing the child's-best-in-
terests test, 4 8 while escaping the confusion of mixing the merits
of a paternity case with the procedural right of standing to as-
sert paternity.149
When a statute does not specify what policy considerations
apply in custody cases, Minnesota courts consistently turn to the
child's-best-interests test.150 In fact, the court in Kelly v. Ca-
taldo advocated this approach when it remanded the case for
want of a guardian ad litem for the child.' 51 The court stated
that "[t]he best interests of the child are one dimension" for the
trial court to consider in deciding the case on remand.' 52
The child's-best-interests standard also satisfies the policy
considerations that parentage acts promote. 153 The UPA, for ex-
ample, originally evolved to protect the rights of illegitimate
children.'54 The Commissioners, therefore, meant for the UPA's
provisions to primarily benefit children.' 55 As such, any actions
brought underneath the UPA or similar state parentage acts
145. Id. § 257.55(2). In Kelly v. Cataldo, the natural mother and her hus-
band urged the court to adopt a general preference for one presumption over
another. 488 N.W.2d 822, 826 (Minn. Ct. App. 1992). The court declined, stat-
ing that the legislature "left no room for our general statement of a dominant
presumption." Id. at 827. Rather, "the legislature has directed the courts.., to
examine the case 'on the facts.'" Id.
146. MnN. STAT. § 257.55.
147. See supra part I.B.2.
148. See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
149. See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
150. In 1914, the Minnesota Supreme Court stated that the supremacy of a
child's best interests was "thoroughly settled law." State ex rel. Larson v. Hal-
verson, 149 N.W. 664, 665 (Minn. 1914); see supra notes 86-88 and accompany-
ing text.
151. 488 N.W.2d 822, 827 (Minn. Ct. App. 1992).
152. Id.
153. See supra notes 9, 12.
154. See supra note 9.
155. According to the drafters of the UPA, "the Act is largely concerned with
the sine qua non of equal legal rights-the identification of the person against
whom these rights may be asserted." UNIF. PARENTAGE AcT, 9B U.L.A. at 289.
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should ultimately address the welfare of the children
involved.156
In addition, parentage acts are said to promote family integ-
rity.157 A child's-best-interests test can help a court determine
which of two presumptions of paternity to recognize to best pre-
serve family integrity. Of course, family integrity is sometimes
best preserved by recognizing legal paternity in a biological
mother's husband. 58 In other cases, when the child has estab-
lished family bonds with both the biological father and the
mother's husband,' 59 courts may best serve family integrity by
recognizing legal paternity in a biological father.160
Moreover, the child's-best-interests test is a better approach
than the substantial-relationship test. If adopted, this substan-
tial-relationship test, like the child's-best-interests test, would
apply after a biological father has gained standing to assert his
paternity, not as a tool to determine standing.161 The substan-
tial-relationship test, however, unlike the child's-best-interests
test, would allow courts to recognize legal paternity only in bio-
logical fathers who have had the opportunity to develop relation-
156. Certainly, an act that denies all biological fathers standing to assert
paternity may serve a child's best interests by preserving that child's marital
family against disruption. See supra text accompanying note 115 (noting that
states may conclude that children are best served by denying biological fathers
standing to rebut a marital presumption of paternity). As the cases that deal
with conflicting presumptions of paternity illustrate, however, such an inflexi-
ble rule will inevitably produce bad results for some children. See supra notes
32-34 (describing cases in which a child's-best-interests analysis might have
produced different results).
157. See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
158. The Washington Supreme Court, which employs the child's-best-inter-
ests test to determine whether a biological father may gain standing to assert
paternity in the face of a marital presumption, stated that in some cases a child
is best served when the court does not allow paternity adjudication. See supra
note 43.
159. See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
160. The Maryland Court of Appeals, for example, uses the child's-best-in-
terests test to weigh the competing interests of the biological father and the
marital family. See supra note 41 and accompanying text. Maryland courts,
therefore, take into account a biological father's commitment to parental re-
sponsibilities, as well as family relationships already formed within the marital
family, in adjudicating paternity. Id.
161. As with the child's-best-interests test, some courts use the substantial-
relationship test in a pre-trial hearing to determine whether a biological father
has standing to assert paternity when a marital presumption of paternity al-
ready exists. See supra part I.B.3. The substantial-relationship test described
here, however, applies after a biological father has gained standing to assert
paternity. The test helps determine whether the biological father's presump-
tion of paternity prevails over the husband's marital presumption in adjudicat-
ing paternity.
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ships with their children. 162 This limitation presents a number
of problems.
First, by limiting courts to recognizing legal paternity only
in biological fathers who have established substantial ties with
their children, the courts discourage biological fathers from
bringing suit shortly after the child is born.163 Fathers who
bring paternity actions early in their children's lives have had
less time to establish substantial relationships with their chil-
dren and, thus, have less chance of establishing a prevailing pre-
sumption of paternity. Courts should seek, however, to
encourage early paternity adjudication. As some courts recog-
nize, "[a] paternity suit, by its very nature, threatens the stabil-
ity of the child's world."164 This threat only increases as the
child gets older.165 Courts, therefore, should be wary of relying
on the substantial-relationship test, which encourages delays in
paternity adjudication.
Second, the substantial-relationship test punishes those bi-
ological fathers who have not received the opportunity to estab-
lish ties to their children. 166 Under this test, a natural mother
can bar a biological father from gaining paternity rights merely
by limiting his contact with his child.167 Limiting such contact,
however, may not best serve the child. If, for example, a biologi-
cal father can show that his resources and desire to raise his
child exceed those of the natural mother and her husband,
courts should recognize legal paternity in the biological father,
rather than deny him paternal rights and duties. 16 3 Application
162. See Dallas, supra note 19, at 376-77.
163. Id. at 385 ([Djefining a minimum custodial period, or, in the alterna-
tive, a minimum frequency of visitation, as a guideline would be reasonable
164. McDaniels v. Carlson, 738 P.2d 254, 261 (Wash. 1987) (en banc).
165. See Kisthardt, supra note 9, at 593 (stating that the UPA limits the
time in which a person may assert paternity "to force consideration of the issue
of parentage before long-term relationships are established between the pre-
sumed father and the child").
166. In Kelly v. Cataldo, for example, Christopher Kelly visited his daughter
only three times before the child's mother severed his ties. 488 N.W.2d 822, 824
(Minn. Ct. App. 1992).
167. Id.; see Dallas, supra note 19, at 384 n.93 (Theoretically, a couple could
conceal a child or simply prevent the putative father from visiting the child and
thereby developing a relationship with her.").
168. Cases in which a biological father can prove that he would be a superior
parent to the mother and her husband are likely rare. They are not, however,
implausible. According to social scientists who have studied human mating
habits, women who are unfaithful to their husbands look for men with "health-
ier genes for their offspring." Allman, supra note 1, at 61 ("Outside affairs also
allow women to shop for better partners."). If women do seek "better partners"
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of the substantial-relationship test would prevent such fathers
from gaining paternal rights, because this test looks only at es-
tablished relationships, not potential relationships. 169
Finally, rejecting the substantial-relationship test does not
prevent a court from considering such relationships when
weighing two presumptions of paternity. Under the child's-best-
interests test, proof of a substantial relationship between a bio-
logical father and his child is relevant to the court's decision.' 70
The substantial-relationship test, however, fails to fully consider
the child's best interests. 17  Thus, the child's-best-interests test
is more comprehensive and provides a better basis than the sub-
stantial-relationship test for courts to analyze conflicting pre-
sumptions of paternity.
CONCLUSION
By allowing a biological father to establish paternity
through genetic tests, the 1989 amendment to the Minnesota
Parentage Act offers biological fathers a new avenue through
which to assert paternal rights. According to the amended act,
this new avenue is available to biological fathers "at any time" to
establish the existence of the father-child relationship. Biologi-
cal fathers, therefore, should be able to assert paternity even
when a marital presumption of paternity already exists. Fur-
thermore, if the amended act does not allow biological fathers
standing to assert their paternity when a marital presumption
to father their children, it follows that biological fathers may have better re-
sources with which to raise their children than do mothers' husbands.
169. See Dallas, supra note 19, at 384.
170. New Jersey courts, which use the child's-best-interests test, consider a
biological father's established relationship with his child when determining the
child's best interests. M.F. v. N.H., 599 A.2d 1297, 1302 (N.J. Super. Ct. App.
Div. 1991). For example, New Jersey courts look to the "consistency of the puta-
tive father's interest in the child," as well as "[clontinuity of established rela-
tionships." Id.
171. Within the substantial-relationship test, the courts do consider
whether continuing the relationship with the child's father is in the child's best
interests. C.C. v. AB., 550 N.E.2d 365, 373 (Mass. 1990) ("We do not address
the issue of what rights this plaintiff may have if he succeeds in establishing
paternity. The overriding principle in determining those rights must be the
best interest of the child."). The substantial-relationship test, however, bars
courts from considering whether establishing a relationship with an alleged bio-
logical father is in the child's best interests. See supra notes 166-169 and ac-
companying text; see also Dallas, supra note 19, at 384 n.93 ("Where the
putative father has not first developed a relationship with the child, current
Supreme Court doctrine gives him no right to claim access to her; potential
relationships between biological parents and children are not protected.").
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of paternity exists, the courts should find that biological fathers
have a constitutionally protected right to such standing.
If a biological father's assertion of paternity creates conflict-
ing presumptions of paternity in two men, courts should use the
child's-best-interests test to analyze which presumption should
prevail. This approach allows the courts flexibility in dealing
with modern, non-traditional families, while protecting all inter-
ested parties.
